

State Capacity and Election Administration in Ukraine

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This paper was prepared for the 2015 Midwest Political Science Association Conference. The authors thank Andriy Magera and Ukraine's Central Electoral Commission for access to personnel data and support in conducting personnel surveys; IFES for technical assistance in developing the surveys and permission to interview subjects at IFES sessions; Michael Thunberg for research assistance; and the participants in the GWU Post-Communist Politics/Social Science Workshop for valuable feedback. The DEC survey received financial support from PACT/UNITER/USAID. The PEC surveys were supported by a National Science Foundation RAPID grant (SES-1462110). All three surveys were conducted in cooperation with the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology. The opinions expressed in this paper are the authors' alone and do not reflect those of other individuals or organizations.

Introduction

Democratic states face a vexing dilemma during periods of natural and anthropogenic crises: how can they perform the essential participatory functions of democracy when unanticipated disruptions interrupt the rhythms of daily life? Natural disasters, such as earthquakes and extreme weather events, can undermine the ability of the state to provide services and citizens to access services. While some anthropogenic events may introduce slow modifications to the physical environment, providing a longer time-frame for adaptation, crises like terrorism, civil wars, irredentist activities, and invasion by external forces, quickly impede the capacity of states to deliver democratic services, requiring nimble adaptation.

Concerns about service provision are magnified when national elections are scheduled. If elections are to serve their essential task as vertical accountability tools (Riker 1988), candidates must be capable of contesting and citizens must be empowered to participate. While elections can be delayed by conflict, as they were in Nigeria in 2015 due to concerns about polling place security, the failure to hold votes can undermine the legitimacy of democratic systems. Indeed, in an effort to maintain legitimacy, the United States held elections on the territories it controlled during the Civil War, and other countries have held elections during large-scale domestic and international conflicts. Scholars have investigated the effects of war on elections, but little research has evaluated administrative adaptation.

This paper investigates state adaptation to conflict by assessing Ukraine's management of the snap parliamentary elections in 2014. These elections present a unique opportunity to investigate how state capacity is maintained in an environment in which sovereignty is threatened. The Central Electoral Commission of Ukraine, the leading institution managing elections, assented to a series of surveys assessing the attitudes and behaviors of commissioners. The observations of civil servants provide a critical lens on the capacity of the state to provide basic services. Civil servants are the front-line bureaucrats who implement government policies and ensure that the basic functions of the state are realized. Because elections are a core function of democratic states, efficient election administration is a necessary component of democratic state capacity. Bureaucrats have direct insights into the quality and extent of services that are provided, and their impressions serve as a measure of state functions. This unprecedented access permits us to explore how various impediments to state activities affected the management of elections across the territory of Ukraine.¹

We explore how institutional, temporal, spatial, partisan, and experiential factors are associated with variation in responses to survey items designed to explore administrative capabilities. The paper proceeds in four parts. First, we present general expectations about the connection between state capacity and election administration. Second, we outline the conditions on the ground, discussing the context of the conflict and election administration in Ukraine. Third, we describe the data and present hypotheses. Fourth, we analyze survey results to assess how Ukrainian bureaucrats adapted to conditions. The paper contributes to our understanding of state capacity, while providing a detailed investigation of Ukraine's efforts to conduct elections during conflict.

¹ Elections were not held in occupied Crimea or in some districts of Donetsk and Luhansk. To ensure the safety of

State Capacity and Administrator Evaluations

In a democratic society, one of the primary activities that states must implement is elections; citizen input in decision-making is at the core of democracy, and the regular conduct of public votes is at the core of democratic state activity. Elections require vast technical, personnel, and financial resources and are challenging to implement even under the best circumstances. Increased scholarly interest in the integrity of elections has directed attention to the role that electoral management bodies play in ensuring that the process is fairly and efficiently conducted. Over the last decade and a half, researchers have assessed poll worker performance (Claassen et al 2008), ballot design and election technology (Wand et al, 2001; Herron and Sekhon 2003; Claassen et al 2013), post-election audits (Hall, Alvarez, and Atkenson 2012), and the overall contribution of efficient administration to free and fair election practices (Mozaffar and Schedler 2002; Hartlyn, McCoy, and Mustillo 2008; Birch 2008; Birch 2012; Alvarez, Atkenson, and Hall 2013). While much of the literature has focused on the experience of the United States, election management in the post-communist world has received scholarly attention (Popova 2006; Herron 2009; Sjoberg 2013).

When interventions, such as civil strife or foreign invasion, intrude on normal electoral processes, legitimacy can be undermined. Conflict can impede contestation by candidates or parties, and undermine the ability of citizens to participate and make known their preferences via the ballot. The response of state agencies to these challenges, and efforts to mitigate the negative effects of conflict, are crucial to understanding how democracy operates under threat. Scholars have investigated the connection between war and elections, emphasizing how election outcomes may be influenced by force commitments abroad (Mack 2002), or the success of fighting forces (Gartner et al 2004; Arena 2008), as well as how the implementation of elections in transitional states can ameliorate or spark conflict, especially among losers (e.g., Przeworski 1991; Rose 2000; Anderson and Mendes 2006; Garfinkel and Skaperdas 2007; Collier 2009; Chacon, Robinson and Torvik 2011; McBride, Milante, and Skaperdas 2011; Cederman et al 2012). Other scholars have emphasized the disruptive effects of conflict, how election administration accommodates internally displaced citizens (Klopp 2001; Prather and Herron 2007; Kasra 2009), or how partisans use conflict to improve outcomes (Wilkinson 2004).

The general tendency in the extant literature is to focus on the connection between conflict and election outcomes, although some research has investigated the impact on the administrative process, as noted above. This paper is designed to extend knowledge about the effects of conflict on administration by focusing on professional evaluations of the state's readiness to provide extensive services to citizens. Election administrators are uniquely positioned to generate useful evaluations of state capacity; they are the front-line bureaucrats who are recruited and trained to conduct elections and have intimate knowledge of the processes. Because they are typically temporary state employees, they are less constrained by concerns about job safety than other bureaucrats who are permanent state employees and may be less inclined to disclose information.

In the context of election administration, "capacity" encompasses the readiness of state agencies to provide services, the perception that participants will be safe in their exercise of the franchise, and confidence that the process is not influenced improperly. These three features – readiness, security, and integrity – form the center of our investigation. In general, we anticipate that stronger perceptions of readiness, security, and integrity among administrators should be

associated with more fully realized state capacity. We also anticipate that variation in the perceptions of state capacity may be influenced by identifiable factors related to the agencies, political or social circumstances, and features of the administrators themselves.

Several factors could influence how civil servants interpret the ability of the state to perform. Differences in *institutional affiliations and responsibilities* may generate variation in perceptions, as their responsibilities vis-à-vis service delivery and exposure to potential disruptions likely differ across administrative levels. Election administration organization varies cross-nationally; it may be hierarchical, with many tiers, or decentralized. Staffing may be permanent at some levels, or it may rely on temporary civil servants. Further, in some countries, partisanship is balanced on commissions while in others professional preparation is the key feature for assignment. The different responsibilities of the institutions, as well as the preparation of the administrators, could also affect how administrators evaluate the process.

In the case of a hierarchical election administration, higher-level officials have less direct contact with voters and the day-to-day activities of the polling stations, but more responsibility for ensuring the integrity of the overall process. More prominent state agents may be perceived as higher-value targets for disruption by insurgents during conflict.² The impact of interfering with a regional administrative unit is likely to be greater than the impact of interfering with a municipal-level administrative unit. Higher-level administrative units are also more likely to be staffed by experienced administrators given their increased level of responsibility. In short, we anticipate that administrator evaluations of the readiness, security, and integrity of the process should be influenced by their institutional affiliation. Higher-level bodies are likely to have more information about the general conditions on the ground, and are more likely to have experienced administrators capable of interpreting information in context.

If elections are conducted in a credible manner in a stable, democratic society, we would anticipate that administrator evaluations of the process should not vary substantially between the pre- and post-election periods. However, if problems emerge in the electoral process, it is possible that responses in post-election polls would differ from those in pre-election polls. In short, *temporal effects* may influence perceptions of capacity. The pre-election expectations for administrators in mature democracies should largely reflect confidence in the democratic process. However, if the elections produce concerns about administrative integrity (e.g., the 2000 US Presidential Election), it is possible that post-election surveys would reflect greater skepticism about the election than pre-election surveys as respondents update their evaluations.

If elections are held in societies where stable democracy has not yet been institutionalized, we may also expect variation in responses from a pre-election to a post-election survey. In this case, greater uncertainty is associated with the likelihood of elections being conducted credibly; administrators may thus express more pre-election skepticism about the potential for the process to be conducted well given this uncertainty. If the election proceeds successfully, post-election evaluations may be elevated as respondents update their expectations and express higher levels of confidence in the process. A problematic election is likely to produce more negative post-election evaluations.

² In the author's observation of the May 2014 presidential election, the security presence appeared to be stronger at district electoral commissions than in polling stations.

Across the globe, elections are held during insurgencies and international conflicts, and we anticipate that holding elections under these conditions is likely to affect administrator evaluations of the process. When states face threats to their territorial integrity, *spatial factors* are also likely to affect perceptions of capacity, especially if the conflict is regionalized. If the state is experiencing internal conflict, it is likely that in regions of conflict, and those contiguous to the conflict, responses are likely to reflect heightened concerns. Administrators serving in conflict zones should be more likely to express concerns about the process than colleagues located further away from the conflict.

Election administration staffing policies vary cross-nationally, with some institutional rules balancing partisanship and others allocating positions in a non-partisan manner. If elections are managed neutrally, both approaches should yield similar processes and outcomes. That is, evaluations of the process and outcomes should not vary based on affiliations if participants have overall confidence in the integrity of administration. However, *partisan factors* may also affect interpretations of election quality, especially if participants question the fairness of administration. Under these circumstances, outsider parties would be more likely to express less satisfaction with administration while parties associated with the winners would be more likely to express greater satisfaction.

State authorities may also act to enhance the skills and experience of civil servants, rendering them more capable to conduct their work. In the case of election administration, civil servants are temporary state employees and would not be exposed to day-to-day standard operating procedures, skills training, or other processes designed to enhance their readiness to do their work. Instead, interventions by permanent state authorities such as training sessions, or specific procedures designed to allay concerns, such as regular contact with law enforcement, could affect evaluations of election procedures. In short, participation in *capacity-building procedures* could serve as important factors affecting how elections are assessed.

Lastly, individual civil servants vary based on their *personal characteristics* such as age, gender, education, and experience. These features may systematically influence how individuals evaluate proceedings.

In sum, we anticipate that bureaucrats' evaluations of the election process will be influenced by several "lenses." The *institutional lens* focuses bureaucrats' attention on different aspects of the process based on their portfolio of responsibilities. The *temporal lens* allows bureaucrats to update their evaluations based on experiences on the ground. The *spatial lens* is associated with risk assessment, with proximity to zones of conflict most strongly influencing evaluations. The *partisan lens* is likely to enhance, or temper, positive assessments depending upon how the individual expects his or her party to perform in the election. In addition, perceptions may be influenced by interventions to enhance preparation through training or access to additional services, and by the individual features of administrators.

In an ideal scenario, neutral, well-managed elections should produce little variation in evaluations. However, we anticipate that even if elections are conducted fairly, assessments may vary based on these features. The degree to which these factors affect evaluations could support,

or undermine, perceptions of legitimacy and the capacity of the state to perform its basic functions. Before presenting specific hypotheses related to the conditions in Ukraine, we outline the context of Ukraine's 2014 parliamentary elections.

The Political Context of Ukraine's 2014 Parliamentary Elections

Ukraine's 2014 snap parliamentary elections took place in October, in response to the ouster of President Viktor Yanukovich and the early dismissal of parliament following the collapse of the parliamentary majority. While the catalyst for snap elections was the collapse of the Yanukovich regime, the origins stretch back to the previous 2010-2012 presidential-parliamentary election cycle.

In 2010, Viktor Yanukovich was elected president of Ukraine, and these elections were widely regarded as legitimate (Herron 2011). While Yanukovich was selected through a fair process, policy decisions in the aftermath of the election raised concerns about declining democratic quality, and the president's behavior was increasingly perceived as anti-democratic by many Ukrainians.³ These concerns were amplified by perceptions of fraud in the late 2010 local elections and 2012 parliamentary elections (Herron and Boyko 2012; Herron 2014).

In late 2013, large-scale protests emerged in response to the regime's decision to renege on a promise to pursue closer relations with the European Union through an Association Agreement. The decision to more closely ally with Russia in economic and political matters mobilized Ukrainian citizens to occupy the main square of the capital city, Kyiv, and protest against the regime. Protests intensified, with government actors increasingly using force in an attempt to disperse protesters. Yanukovich fled the country in February after his support dwindled in the wake of security forces killing dozens of protesters.

The ouster of Yanukovich prompted the interim government to call an early presidential election. On February 22, 2014, parliament voted to return the balance of institutional power to parliament and away from the presidency, consistent with earlier constitutional revisions. Politicians further debated aspects of the European integration process in the context of constitutional reform. Party of Regions representatives who remained in parliament insisted that snap elections should be held in late 2014. It was not until April that it became fully clear elections would be conducted in May 2014.

Conditions for the implementation of elections substantially changed over the course of 2014. After Yanukovich's flight, Russia increased its direct involvement in Ukraine's political life, first by occupying and annexing Crimea, and later by instigating separatist violence in Donetsk and Luhansk. The annexation of Crimea, not recognized by the Ukrainian government, left twelve

³ Public opinion surveys conducted annually by IFES document the changing perceptions of democratic quality in Ukraine. While the immediate aftermath of Yanukovich's election produced more confident responses in Ukraine's social and political conditions, satisfaction with Yanukovich's management of the economy, international relations, and other matters declined over time. Ukrainians were divided on many issues, but perceptions of corruption can be detected in responses. For example, a plurality of respondents in the 2011 survey indicated that prosecutions of Yuliya Tymoshenko and Yuriy Lutsenko were politically motivated; a majority indicated this perspective if the response of "politically motivated and legitimate" is added to the total. Moreover, the proportion of Ukrainians "concerned" or "alarmed" at Yanukovich's respect for rights and freedoms increased, and the proportion who were "alarmed" also increased. See the reports at ifes.org.

districts unable to conduct elections. Conflict in Donetsk and Luhansk further disenfranchised Ukrainian citizens by rendering elections impossible in many regions. Violence disrupted daily life in many corners of Donetsk and Luhansk, with concerns raised that the conflict might spread into other areas. At the time of the snap presidential elections, one of Ukraine's regions (Crimea) was occupied and outside of state control, combat operations were being conducted in Donetsk and Luhansk undermining state control, and heightened fears of expanded conflict threatened many other regions.

The collapse of the Yanukovich administration had a significant effect on partisan competition. Yanukovich's party-of-power, the Party of Regions, did not dissolve, but fractured. In the presidential election, four candidates who had been affiliated with the Party of Regions contested, although three of them were formally disbarred from the party. The strongest candidate among the Party of Regions group was Serhiy Tihipko, and he only managed to garner 5.2% of the vote, finishing ahead of the official candidate, Mikhail Dobkin, who received 3%. Petro Poroshenko, a businessman and politician who had been allied both with Yanukovich and the opposition at different points in his career, dominated the vote, receiving over 54% nationally, and garnering more votes than any other candidate in every district except for one. The presidential election was unusually decisive; it is the only election in Ukraine's independent history to be decided in the first round of voting.

Soon after his election to the presidency, Poroshenko indicated that he was committed to holding early parliamentary elections. After the governing coalition disbanded in July, the president announced the dissolution of parliament in late August with early elections to be conducted in late October.⁴ During the summer, the front lines in combat operations changed substantially, with Ukrainian security forces advancing into territories that had been occupied by Russian-backed "insurgents." Conflict did not subside during the campaign; violence threatened voters and administrators in many parts of Donetsk and Luhansk. The parliamentary elections added a complication to administration, however. Whereas the presidential elections focused on a single office elected nationally, Ukraine's mixed electoral system evenly divided parliamentary seats into 225 selected by a nationwide party list vote and 225 selected in single-member constituencies. The failure to hold votes in the constituencies would not only undermine citizen suffrage, but could prevent regions from selecting representatives.

The Party of Regions formally boycotted the parliamentary election, although it participated in election administration.⁵ Several parties wooed Party of Regions supporters; indeed, many of the major political parties welcomed and nominated former Party of Regions candidates.⁶ The Opposition Bloc and Strong Ukraine had the clearest connection to the Party of Regions, and the

⁴ The dissolution of the majority was not due to unresolvable conflict, but rather as a pretense to hold early elections. Ukraine's constitution permits the president to call snap elections if the coalition collapses. Pro-European forces, eager to oust anti-European forces from parliament, pursued early elections as a tool to accomplish this goal.

⁵ As a registered parliamentary faction, the Party of Regions was guaranteed positions on election commissions. It is worth noting that the Communist Party Faction in parliament was dissolved a few months prior to the election, in part to eliminate its access to guaranteed seats on EMBs.

⁶ In addition, not only did parties attempt to attract former Party of Regions candidates, but they also shared EMB personnel. In a separate analysis of technical party personnel in the elections, we noted that likely allies such as the Opposition Bloc, CPU, and Strong Ukraine drew from Party of Regions personnel. However, the Poroshenko Bloc, People's Front, and Batkivshchyna also benefited from Party of Regions EMB quotas.

Communist Party could also appeal to core voters who had historically supported the Party of Regions. The Opposition Bloc received 9.4% of the party list vote, and 29 seats overall. No other successor to the Party of Regions passed the 5% threshold for the proportional representation ballot, although Strong Ukraine received a constituency seat.

In sum, ongoing conflict in the East affected election logistics, the choice set facing voters, and the context in which voters would interpret political appeals. The next section describes how election administrators in Ukraine were organized to address these challenges.

Election Administration in Ukraine

In this volatile environment, hundreds of thousands of civil servants⁷ were mobilized by Ukraine's state administration to manage the process. The election apparatus is hierarchical, with the Central Electoral Commission (CEC) functioning as a permanent body dedicated to managing the electoral process. Subordinated to the CEC are 225 District Electoral Commissions (DECs) that oversee more than 30,000 Precinct Electoral Commissions (PECs). We focus on the lower two levels of election administration, DECs and PECs, in our analysis. Both of these levels are temporary, with civil servants selected for the election period only. DECs are formed first, and they have responsibility for ensuring that PECs in their territory are staffed with the requisite number of officials who receive training and resources to conduct the elections.

DECs and PECs constitute the front lines of election administration; they deal directly with voters and are responsible for the casting, counting and ballot compilation processes. Commissioners manage different tasks in DECs and PECs. At the DEC-level, commissioners render decisions on PEC formation, composition of the membership and distribution of the officers' positions throughout the PECs, and they also compile and certify results. At the PEC-level, commissioners manage polling places, setting up for the election, checking voter identification, distributing ballots, maintaining a secure chain of custody, counting the ballots after the election concludes, and transferring official documentation to the DEC. While some aspects of the election administration apparatus are consistent in parliamentary and presidential elections, election statutes identify differences.

While snap elections do not differ substantially from standard elections in their administrative demands, the timeline for completing election preparations is shortened. In the parliamentary election, DECs were formed 50 days prior to the election, but PECs were formed only 15 days prior to the election. Although Ukraine's government does not recognize the annexation of Crimea, conditions on the ground did not permit it to form DECs in the region. The CEC briefly considered establishing polling places to accommodate displaced Crimean Tatars, DECs dedicated to Crimean voters were not established. According to the parliamentary election law, DECs are formed by the CEC and range in size from 12-18 commissioners. PECs in ordinary precincts varied from 10-18 commissioners, based on the number of voters registered in the polling place.⁸

⁷ In a technical sense, election administrators are civil servants as they are state agents who are provided a salary to implement policies. However, it is important to note that they are not beholden to the same influences as permanent civil servants, nor are they professionalized in the same manner as permanent civil servants. We use this term cautiously in the paper.

⁸ The smallest commissions could be comprised of as few as 10 members; the largest could have 18 members.

Positions on commissions are divided into two categories: members and officers. Members have voting rights, participate in deliberations and decision-making, and manage the day-to-day activities of the commissions during the election period. Officers (chair, deputy chair, and secretary) have additional responsibilities as well as agenda-setting authority. The CEC appointed officers for each DEC, and the DECs in turn appointed officers for PECs in their region of responsibility. Officers were assigned proportionally to parties and candidates; each contestant was entitled to a share of every managerial position. At the PEC level, partisan balance was complemented by balance across PECs of different sizes, with parties or candidates receiving the appropriate number of posts in large, medium, and small PECs. However, the law did not prescribe how the balance was to be achieved spatially; these decisions were undertaken by the DECs in negotiation with parties and candidates. Decisions rendered at the DECs and PECs can strongly influence election outcomes as commissions have the right to validate – or invalidate – individual ballots as well as the counts made by an entire polling place.

In the presidential election, candidates were guaranteed representation on all commissions.⁹ However, the level of competition in the parliamentary elections was too great to accommodate all parties and candidates. Registered parliamentary parties (factions) were guaranteed representation on the commissions. Within DECs, parties that participated in the 2012 parliamentary election on the party list could also nominate members. At the PEC-level, parties registered on the 2014 party list and candidates in the single member districts could nominate commissioners. After allocation of seats to parliamentary faction representatives, the remaining seats were determined via lottery. Our survey data indicate that 55% of DEC officers were recruited via party meetings or gatherings and 26% were invited by relatives or friends. At the PEC-level, only 38% of commissioners were mobilized by party organizations whereas 47% were recruited by friends or relatives.

Data, Variables, and Hypotheses

Data

The primary data used in the analysis of professional/personnel adaptation come from surveys of civil servants implemented from late September to early November 2014. The project required the cooperation of Ukrainian officials, and we received substantial support from the CEC which sanctioned the implementation of the survey. All three surveys collected basic demographic information about the respondents, as well as their level of education, occupation, partisan affiliation, nominating party/candidate, location of services, and experience on electoral commissions (See Table 1 for respondent characteristics).

Insert Table 1 about here

The first survey implemented chronologically assessed the attitudes of DEC officials, asking questions about the formation and functions of DECs, member knowledge and training, logistical support for DECs, member compensation, influences on DECs, and the functions of PECs. Surveys were completed via two methods from September 30-October 8, 2014. Questionnaires were distributed for self-completion (273) at the Central Electoral Commission's training session

⁹ The snap presidential elections yielded a different problem of personnel – inadequate staffing of EMBs (Boyko, Herron, and Sverdau 2014). During these elections, the official sizes of EMBs were altered due to the staffing crisis.

for DEC officers, and 141 surveys were completed by telephone interviews. In sum, we received 414 completed surveys. The total population consists of 639 individuals (DEC officers), rendering a sampling error of 2.9% with 95% confidence.

The second and third surveys consisted of a pre- and post-election panel wave of PEC members and officers. PEC officials were interviewed in person and by telephone, with 2,020 participants in the pre-election survey and 1,758 in both the pre- and post-election surveys (12.97% attrition).¹⁰ The post-election survey rephrased many pre-election survey questions, and asked a battery of questions about respondents' experiences on election day. In the first survey wave, conducted from October 13-23, 2014, two-thirds of the interviews were face-to-face. In the second wave, conducted from November 1-November 21, 2014, two-thirds were conducted by telephone. The first survey wave included respondents serving as officers or commission members in 1,540 different polling stations and 179 districts across Ukraine (excluding Crimea). The second survey wave included respondents from 1,382 polling stations and 178 districts. Based on the population of polling station officials, the sampling error does not exceed 2.2% for the pre-election survey and 2.3% for the post-election survey.¹¹

Variables

We investigate the capacity of the state to conduct credible elections during political crisis by focusing on insights from civil servants. We evaluate administrator attitudes about the readiness of Ukraine's electoral commissions to conduct elections, the security situation and perceptions of safety, and the integrity of the voting process. We anticipate that administrators' evaluations will be affected by institutional, temporal, spatial, partisan, capacity-building, and personal factors.

Dependent Variables

Our dependent variables are drawn from survey questions related to the underlying concepts of readiness, security, and integrity. To evaluate readiness, we assess responses to several questions related to logistical preparations. At both the DEC and PEC levels, we asked administrators to indicate if the the statutory timeline for pre-election preparation was sufficient. In addition, we asked PEC officials if they were prepared to conduct elections, and if not, what problems they anticipated on election day.

Insert Table 2 about here

Two of these questions – time sufficiency and preparedness – form our dependent variables evaluating readiness. Both of the dependent variables are replies to five-point scales about the amount of time available¹² and the relative level of preparation.¹³ Table 2 shows the distribution

¹⁰ The cooperation rate for the first wave was 66% and for the second wave it was 90%.

¹¹ Because of the short timeline from PEC formation until the election, many interviews were conducted at training sessions managed by the International Foundation of Electoral Systems. It is possible that surveying respondents who were more likely to receive training could introduce bias into the results. However, the logistics of the election required this accommodation.

¹² The PEC question asked: "According to the election law, PECs are formed no later than 15 days before election day. How sufficient is this timeline for PECs to fulfill their duties prescribed in the law?" The DEC question asked "How sufficient is the election timeline for DEC's to fulfill their duties prescribed in the law?" Respondents could reply completely sufficient, somewhat sufficient, neither sufficient nor insufficient, somewhat insufficient, completely insufficient, or difficult to say/do not know. The dependent variable is scaled 1-5; completely sufficient is

of responses, revealing that administrators were generally positive in their assessments of both dependent variables. The mean for time sufficiency among DEC respondents was 2.52 with a standard deviation of 1.11, and 2.20 among PEC respondents with a standard deviation of 1.09. The means are not statistically different from one another, although pessimistic responses are more common among DEC respondents. The mean for the second dependent variable is 1.98 in the pre-election PEC poll and 1.60 in the post-election poll, with standard deviations of 0.87 and 0.80, respectively. The post-election responses are more likely to be optimistic, not surprising given the relatively smooth election process that occurred across most of the country. In both cases, respondents were generally optimistic about the level of readiness for the elections.

To code our dependent variable related to security, we developed an index from a battery of security-related questions to better assess the intensity of concerns.¹⁴ Once again, most respondents expressed general confidence in the process; around 20% or fewer respondents identified one or more security concerns in the DEC survey; 13% in the PEC pre-election survey, and under 5% in the post-election survey. The intensity of respondents varied, with some respondents identifying up to four security concerns.

Unlike readiness or security, where we could ask direct questions about the concept, we could not directly ask about election integrity. Instead, we asked several questions about the electoral process, including the impact of staffing changes, the effects of party financial compensation, and the perceptions of fraud. The distribution of responses is displayed on Table 2.

The first dependent variable related to integrity asks respondents to assess the role of supplementary compensation. Every official working on the DEC or PEC receives a stipend from the state for their work. However, many parties and candidates that nominate commissioners provide supplementary pay. The initial dependent variable related to compensation asked how important compensation was to the respondent, and their replies were on a five-point scale.¹⁵ Table 1 shows that DEC respondents less commonly indicated that supplementary compensation was important; around half of PEC respondents in both the pre- and post-election surveys indicated that it was important. The mean for the DEC survey was 3.3 with a standard deviation of 1.3; the PEC means were 2.6 and 2.7 for the pre- and post-election surveys, and standard deviations were 1.2 for both. We further inquired among PEC respondents if there was an

coded as 1. Because the question implies that the election has not yet taken place, we did not repeat this question on the post-election survey.

¹³ The question asked: "In your opinion, how well prepared is your current PEC to manage the voting and counting process on election day?" Respondents could reply completely prepared, somewhat prepared, neither prepared nor unprepared, somewhat unprepared, completely unprepared, or difficult to say/do not know. The dependent variable is scaled 1-5; completely prepared is coded as 1. Given the question wording, it did not apply to DEC respondents and was not included on that survey.

¹⁴ The index compiles responses to several dichotomous items, including "I am concerned about my personal safety," "I am concerned about the safety of my friends and family due to my work on the commission," "I am concerned about the possibility of violence on election day," and "I have considered resigning my position because of security concerns." The variable ranges from 0-4.

¹⁵ The question asked: "To what extent is compensation from the party/faction/candidate that nominated you to the DEC/PEC important to you?" Respondents could indicate important, somewhat important, neither important nor unimportant, somewhat unimportant, or unimportant.

implied quid pro quo in supplementary payments.¹⁶ In the pre-election PEC survey, 20.4% of respondents indicated that they agreed/somewhat agreed with the notion of an implied quid pro quo; 17.5% agreed in the post-election survey. The mean was 3.8 in the pre election survey, with a standard deviation of 1.4, and 4.0 in the post election survey, with a standard deviation of 1.3. This response is especially useful as a proxy for integrity.

Finally, in the post-election PEC survey, we asked respondents to evaluate how common fraud was in the election. Only 5% indicated that fraud was common – and 81% indicated that it was uncommon – generally consistent with international observer assessments of the overall election process. While this question serves as our most direct assessment of integrity, the sensitive nature of the question suggests that it should not stand alone as the sole measure of integrity. Taken together, the four dependent variables related to integrity should permit us to gauge perceptions of the election process and its overall quality.

Independent Variables

To evaluate our institutional and temporal factors, we assess differences across the surveys. Institutional influences should be captured by differences between DEC and PEC surveys, and temporal effects should be captured by differences across the pre- and post-election PEC surveys. We include several explanatory variables to evaluate spatial, partisan, experience-based, and personal features.

Insert Figure 1 about here

To control for spatial effects, we include variables representing regional divisions in Ukraine. We use an eight-region division (Barrington and Herron 2004)¹⁷ that accounts for historical, economic, and social affinities that transcend formal political boundaries, but divides Ukraine into a manageable subset of regions (See Figure 1). We expect that respondents located in the East (Donetsk and Luhansk) to evidence the highest levels of impact due to conflict, with commissioners from the Eastcentral (Kharkiv, Dnipropetrovsk, Zaporizhzhia) and South (Odesa, Kherson, and Mykolaivsk) to manifest lower levels of impact than the East, but higher than other regions of the country. The macro-regions are dichotomous variables; the East is the excluded comparison category.¹⁸

As noted above, partisan affiliations guide the allocation of commission positions. Because parliamentary factions, parties, and candidates, are given the opportunity to gain commission

¹⁶ We asked respondents: "Do you agree or disagree with the following statement: "Political parties/factions/candidates who pay more to their PEC members expect to get more votes in that PEC?" They could respond strongly agree, somewhat agree, neither agree nor disagree, somewhat disagree, strongly disagree.

¹⁷ Crimea is excluded from the analysis, so the division is effectively seven-region.

¹⁸ We also analyzed the data using an alternate spatial measure – distance from DEC 60, the focal point of conflict at the time of the election. That variable calculated the straight-line distance from the position of the DEC's office. Our underlying assumption was that greater distance would yield a less intense effect; indeed, we generally found this to be the case. A challenge with this variable is that it requires a fixed point of reference, but administrators may interpret distance differently. That is, they may evaluate the distance to the occupied territories as more salient than their distance from a specified point of conflict. Moreover, while the most intense conflict was occurring near DEC 60, other skirmishes were taking place at election time. We use macro-regions in this analysis, but are exploring alternative spatial measures.

seats, the Party of Regions – the former party-of-power affiliated with Yanukovich – participated in election administration even though it boycotted the election. Because we anticipate that Party of Regions representatives would be most likely to express pessimism about the process, it is the comparison category. We include dichotomous variables for other parties that received commission seats: Poroshenko Bloc, Batkivshchyna, and Radical Party on DEC and PECs, UDAR and Svoboda on DEC only, and Strong Ukraine, People's Front and the Opposition Bloc on PECs only. We also control for representatives of other parties and candidates.

We use several questions to assess training and experience. The DEC survey asked a question about the quality of training provided to commissioners, rated on a five-point scale, and the PEC survey asked a question about participation in training (yes/no). We include this variable in several assessments of readiness, security, and integrity. In general, we anticipate that participation in training (and satisfaction with training) is likely to be associated with more optimistic assessments of outcomes as participants gain skills, confidence, and context through participation in training activities.

We supplement the training question in assessments of security by adding two variables. The first question asked if the respondent received additional security training, a dichotomous variable. We anticipate that supplementary training likely engenders greater confidence. The second question asked if respondents were in regular contact with law enforcement, also a dichotomous variable. Contact with law enforcement should also produce more positive assessments of the security situation. For the dependent variable related to supplementary compensation, we add a question assessing the respondent's attitude to state compensation. We include this additional variable to evaluate if general attitudes about compensation drive attitudes about supplementary pay. The variable is a five-point scale, reflecting the respondent's level of satisfaction with state compensation.

Lastly, we include explanatory variable related to the vote counting process on assessments of fraud. Because protocol changes and long processing times are often associated with allegations of election fraud, we include administrator observations of these activities in their polling stations. The variable measuring processing time reflects the respondent's report of the number of hours needed to prepare all of the documents to transport to the district commission. The variable measuring changes to the protocol asks if alterations occurred (and is thus dichotomous).

We control for personal characteristics by including variables for gender, age, education, and experience. Gender and experience are dichotomous, education is an ordinal variable, and age is continuous.

Hypotheses

In the case of Ukraine, the 2014 parliamentary elections were conducted in a society where democracy has not been institutionalized and the territorial integrity of the state was under threat. While the elections were held under uncertain conditions, international and domestic observers indicated that they largely conformed with democratic standards.¹⁹ Given our general

¹⁹ See, for example, the OSCE Final Report (<http://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/ukraine/132556>).

expectations about the effects of institutional, temporal, spatial, partisan, capacity-building, and personal features noted above, we assess several hypotheses.

Hypothesis 1: DEC-level officials are more likely to express skepticism about readiness, security, and integrity.

Hypothesis 2: Respondents' post-election evaluations of readiness, security, and integrity are likely to express more confidence in the process than pre-election evaluations.

Hypothesis 3: Respondents located closer to regions of conflict, notably in the East and Eastcentral macroregions, are more likely to express skepticism the readiness, security, and integrity of elections.

Hypothesis 4: Respondents associated with parties affiliated with the former party of power, notably the Party of Regions, but also Strong Ukraine, Opposition Bloc, and Communist Party, are more likely to express skepticism about the readiness, security, and integrity of the elections.

Hypothesis 5: Respondents exposed to additional training and state services (e.g., contact with law enforcement) are more likely to express optimism about the readiness, security, and integrity of the process.

Analysis

We begin our analysis by assessing administrator evaluations of readiness. Table 3 displays the models for DEC and PEC respondents' views of the sufficiency of time to prepare for the elections. Few explanatory variables are consistent predictors of outcomes, except for training. While the signs of the coefficients run in opposite directions, the interpretation of the outcome is similar. That is, as DEC members are more satisfied with training, they are also more satisfied with the amount of time provided to prepare for the election. For PEC respondents, those who attended training (a "1" on the dichotomous variable) were more likely to evaluate time as sufficient.

Spatial variables played a limited explanatory role in these models. While respondents in the Southwest were more likely to express confidence in all but one model, this relationship was significant only at the .10 level. Responses from other regions were either no different from the excluded category or significant in only one model. Partisan variables behaved similarly. In the DEC models, respondents nominated by Svoboda were more likely to be optimistic about preparations, though only at the .10 level. In the PEC models, representatives of the Poroshenko Bloc were also more likely to be confident at the .05 level. Surprisingly, however, representatives of the Opposition Bloc and Communist Party were more likely than the Party of Regions to be optimistic, albeit at the .10 level. Personal characteristics varied in their effects. Higher levels of education were associated with more optimism in the DEC models; greater experience was associated with more skepticism in the DEC model as was higher age in the PEC models.

Insert Table 3 about here

Asking respondents about preparation rather than time produced more consistent results. In both the pre- and post-election PEC surveys displayed in Table 3, spatial variables were statistically significant. All regions were more likely to express confidence in preparation relative to the East. Respondents in the Eastcentral region, contiguous to the region of conflict, behaved more like their peers in the rest of the country than in the embattled Donbas. Training had an effect in the pre-election model at the .10 level, with attendance at training being associated with greater confidence in preparation.

Insert Table 4 about here

Table 4 displays results of the model assessing evaluations of security. Spatial variables were consistently significant and in the expected direction; respondents in regions outside of the East were more likely to express confidence in the security situation by identifying fewer concerns.²⁰ Partisanship had a limited effect on security perceptions. In the DEC model, the Poroshenko Bloc and Svoboda were more likely to identify additional security concerns; other parties identified fewer. In the pre-election PEC survey, the Communist Party was more likely to identify concerns, but it was not significantly different from the excluded category in the post-election survey. Women respondents in the PEC survey were more likely to express security concerns.

Experiential variables also exerted an effect. DEC respondents who were less satisfied with training were also more likely to identify security issues. Training did not exert an effect on PEC respondent evaluations. However, additional security training consistently depressed reports of security concerns, with participation in additional training associated with fewer concerns in both DEC and PEC surveys. Increased contact with law enforcement also had a positive effect, but only among PEC respondents.

Insert Table 5 about here

Tables 5-6 show results of our assessments of integrity. Table 5 assesses respondent attitudes about supplementary compensation by parties and candidates. The only variable consistently affecting the outcome is respondent attitudes about state compensation. That is, in the DEC and PEC surveys, respondents who were more likely to evaluate state compensation as insufficient were more likely to indicate that supplementary pay was important. Some political party variables were significant in at least one model; representatives nominated by the Poroshenko Bloc and Radical Party indicated that compensation was important in the DEC model; Svoboda and Communist Party respondents were more likely to indicate that compensation was not important (the former in the DEC model, the latter in the PEC pre-election model). Region played a role in the PEC models, with Westcentral, West, and Southwest respondents more likely to indicate that party compensation was less important to participation.

Table 6 shows the results of our models assessing the connection between pay and outcomes, and direct evaluations of fraud. The pre-election and first post-election model assesses respondent attitude to the proposition that supplementary pay, addressed in the previous table, is a quid pro quo. The pre- and post-election assessments yielded similar results; in some regions (South,

²⁰ The Southwest region was not statistically significant in the DEC model.

Northcentral, and Westcentral), respondents were more likely to judge side payments as an implicit bonus for fraudulent activities. Respondents with more education and more experience were also more likely to evaluate side payments in this way, albeit inconsistently.

The direct assessment of fraud yielded similar outcomes. Region mattered, with respondents in all but one area less likely to indicate that fraud was less common than in the East. Notably, respondents in the West were more likely to express concerns about fraud, a point we will address in the discussion below.

Discussion

The previous section presented evidence from our three surveys, describing the analysis of models designed to untangle variation in respondent assessments of readiness, security, and integrity. The results of these analyses speak to our hypotheses, and in this section we summarize and evaluate the evidence that supports or refutes our expectations.

Our first hypothesis highlighted the likelihood of institutional variation in the assessment of the administrative process. We anticipated that the greater prominence of DEC members would render them more likely targets, enhancing security concerns. Further, the more experienced DEC members, possessing more institutional knowledge, were more likely to express skepticism about the truncated process for snap elections. The evidence for institutional differences is mixed. While DEC respondents expressed slightly more pessimistic assessments of readiness, a substantial majority (63%) indicated that the time allocated to prepare was sufficient. While the mean for security concerns was higher than the PEC surveys, the DEC results fell well within one standard deviation of the PEC outcomes. The most substantial difference between DEC members and PEC members was on the question related to party compensation; for DEC members, supplementary pay was far less important to participation than for PEC members. This outcome may be due to an important institutional difference – far more PEC members must be recruited; DEC positions are of higher status and require more extensive experience. In sum, outcomes varied based on the institutional affiliations of respondents, but differences on many response items were small, providing weak evidence in support of Hypothesis 1.

We also anticipated that the relatively smooth electoral process witnessed in Ukraine would produce more positive post-election assessments. On the items where we could directly assess differences, the post-election evaluations were generally more positive. The proportion of respondents indicating that the PEC was prepared was almost nine percentage points higher in the post-election survey; the proportion of respondents indicating that they had no security concerns was almost eight percentage points higher; and respondents suggesting that a quid pro quo existed for supplementary payments was around three percentage points lower. The results provide weak support for Hypothesis 2.

Among the most consistent and important factors in evaluating variations in a range of outcomes were the spatial variables. While they were not significant in differentiating responses based on time sufficiency, region mattered substantially for preparation, security, and integrity. Using the East as a baseline, we anticipated that respondents in other regions would be more confident and secure, and this was our general finding across most models. We also expected a contagion effect, with respondents in the Eastcentral region clearly being less confident than their peers

further west, but this was not the case consistently. A positive interpretation of these outcomes, especially for Ukraine's government, is that they suggest that the influence of the conflict were largely contained to regions with active combat.

A notable finding that challenged our basic assumptions about region was the finding that concerns about fraud were more common in the West than in the East. The West encompasses a region where many of the major parties competing in the election – Batkivshchyna, Svoboda, Radical Party, Samopomich – were most likely to have strong core supporters. The intense partisan competition for voters in that area could have encouraged advocates of those parties to engage in illicit behaviors. In sum, the results provide strong support for Hypothesis 3.

Partisanship was an inconsistent predictor of outcomes. One of the reasons for partisanship's relative weakness could be the measure itself. We used nomination as our assessment of an individual's partisanship. However, due to widespread staffing changes, an endemic problem in Ukraine (Boyko, Herron, and Sverdun 2015), it is possible that party-backed representatives may have weak ties to the organization that placed them on the commission. In some cases - in the models for readiness, for instance - our expectations were realized in a few notable cases (e.g., Svoboda and the Poroshenko Bloc's relative confidence in readiness). However, we also found contradictory results, such as the Opposition Bloc's confidence in readiness. These outcomes could also be an artifact of the comparison category – the Party of Regions. While it is the best option to use as the comparison category because its partisans served on both DEC and PECs, and it is the former party-of-power, the Party of Regions also collaborated with other parties during the election, perhaps diluting the partisan effect. The readiness of the Party of Regions to share its quotas and personnel with a wide range of parties could diminish partisan effects. In support of that interpretation is the observation that partisanship was more consistent and useful for DEC models than PEC models. In sum, partisanship was a weak and inconsistent predictor of variation in assessments of readiness, security, and integrity, providing limited support for Hypothesis 4.

Our set of explanatory factors addressing training and experience generally produced expected effects. Training was an important predictor of attitudes about readiness and security. Additional security training and contact with law enforcement were also contributors to more optimistic assessments of the security situation. These findings point to valuable interventions that state institutions can make to improve the implementation of elections and strengthen state capacity. More – and better – training, as well as training targeted on specific critical areas, in addition to formal cooperation between election administrators and supporting bureaucratic agencies, enhances the confidence of civil servants to conduct their tasks during crisis situations. Overall, the results provide substantial support for Hypothesis 5.

To summarize, officials expressed overall confidence in the process, with limited differences across different institutional levels, or over time. Variation in confidence, however, was most fruitfully attributed to spatial features and capacity-building. These outcomes speak to the Ukraine's success in containing the conflict and diminishing its negative effects, and the positive role of training and institutional cooperation in enhancing administrators' confidence.

Conclusion

Our main focus was to assess state adaptation to crisis conditions, focusing on the example of election administration in Ukraine. We argued that the observations of election administrators provide crucial information about the state's readiness to provide services, the security of administrators and citizens, and the overall integrity of the process. We noted that differences in institutional, temporal, spatial, partisan, experiential, and personal features could influence how administrators interpret their surroundings. We found that spatial and experiential factors seemed to play a role, but other factors were limited in their effects.

The outcomes speak not only to the case of Ukraine, but to state capacity in general. Ukraine's elections were generally considered to be a success, with problems largely contained to the areas of active combat. Our analysis supports this interpretation; indeed, evidence of contagion outside Donbas is limited. Further, training and coordination activities seem to have enhanced administrator confidence, speaking to a crucial role that government-sponsored interventions can have on capacity.

In other cases, however, institutional, temporal, or partisan factors may intervene. The general categories deployed in this analysis could be extended to other forms of service provision in other contexts to better understand how well states respond to crises. Better understanding the factors that influence interpretations of state capacity – especially during political crises – should help advance disciplinary knowledge on this critical subject while also equipping practitioners to develop more effective responses.

Table 1: Respondent Characteristics

	DEC Pre-Election	PEC Pre-Election	PEC Post-Election
% Male	42.5	21.0	20.3
% Experienced (>1 election as commissioner)	89.7	78.8	80.0
% Officer	100	76.9	77.7
% Member	0	23.2	22.3
% Completed University Education	84.5	48.4	48.5
Location: % Oblast Center	N/A	15.7	15.7
Location: % City >20,000	N/A	12.2	12.2
Location: % City <20,000	N/A	11.1	11.1
Location: % Village	N/A	61.0	61.0
PEC Size: Large (>1,500)	N/A	31.3	30.8
PEC Size: Medium (500-1500)	N/A	36.8	36.8
PEC Size: Small (<500)	N/A	32.0	32.4

Table 2: Variation in Responses on the Dependent Variables

			DEC Pre- Election	PEC Pre- Election	PEC Post- Election
Readiness	Time Allocated Sufficient?	Sufficient/Somewhat	63.29	73.91	
		Neither Suff. nor Insuff.	6.04	5.25	
		Insufficient/Somewhat	28.51	19.51	
		Do Not Know/Refused	2.17	1.34	
		Mean	2.52	2.20	
		Standard Deviation	1.11	1.09	
	Prepared?	Completely/Somewhat		82.97	91.47
		Neither Prep. nor Unprep.		5.15	3.58
		Completely/Somewhat		9.40	4.83
		Do Not Know/Refused		2.48	0.12
		Mean		1.98	1.60
		Standard Deviation		0.87	0.80
Security	Security Scale	0 Items	79.47	87.28	95.16
		1 Item	9.18	7.67	3.41
		2 Items	7.73	3.51	0.80
		3 Items	1.69	1.04	0.34
		4 Items	1.93	0.50	0.28
		Mean	0.37	0.20	0.07
		Standard Deviation	0.85	0.59	0.37
Integrity	Party Compensation Important?	Important/Somewhat	28.57	50.05	46.99
		Neither Imp. nor Unimp	11.86	12.82	7.85
		Unimportant/Somewhat	49.34	25.00	11.15
		Do Not Know/Refused	9.69	12.13	34.01
		Mean	3.34	2.62	2.69
		Standard Deviation	1.25	1.20	1.21
	Parties Paying More Expect Votes	Agree/Somewhat		20.35	17.52
		Neither Agree nor Dis.		10.05	6.31
		Disagree/Somewhat		53.51	62.34
		Do Not Know/Refused		16.09	13.82
		Mean		3.78	4.04
		Standard Deviation		1.38	1.30
	Fraud	Common/Somewhat			5.01
		Neither Com nor Unc.			4.10
		Uncommon/Somewhat			81.06
		Do Not Know/Refused			9.84
		Mean			4.49
	Standard Deviation			0.83	

Note: The DEC question about staff changes asked respondents to indicate if changes were positive, somewhat positive, neither positive nor negative, somewhat negative, or negative. The PEC question asked if changes were positive or negative.

Table 3: Multivariate Analysis of Administrator Assessments of Readiness (Sufficient Time)

	DEC				PEC Pre			
	Coefficient	S.E.	Coefficient	S.E.	Coefficient	S.E.	Coefficient	S.E.
	DV: Time		DV: Time		DV: Time		DV: Time	
Training			0.412**	0.068			-0.260*	0.136
CPU	0.156	0.387	0.137	0.377	-0.357*	0.218	-0.376*	0.216
Poroshenko Bloc	-0.362	0.340	-0.299	0.374	-0.371**	0.173	-0.374**	0.171
Batkivshchyna	-0.183	0.258	-0.318	0.250	-0.189	0.175	-0.198	0.173
Radical Party	-0.314	0.392	-0.297	0.349	-0.181	0.193	-0.197	0.191
Strong Ukraine					-0.082	0.201	-0.084	0.199
Opposition Bloc					-0.368*	0.222	-0.374*	0.221
People's Front					-0.297	0.185	-0.286	0.183
UDAR	0.067	0.257	0.051	0.248				
Svoboda	-0.453*	0.266	-0.461*	0.256				
Other	0.157	0.209	0.201	0.198	-0.145	0.169	-0.156	0.168
Eastcentral	-0.022	0.201	0.140	0.187	-0.049	0.176	-0.043*	0.180
South	0.232	0.245	0.343	0.232	0.039	0.185	0.058	0.189
Northcentral	0.211	0.200	0.329*	0.189	-0.210	0.164	-0.187	0.169
Westcentral	0.125	0.223	0.188	0.209	-0.330	0.161	-0.304	0.165
West	0.180	0.213	0.276	0.196	-0.083	0.188	-0.069	0.192
Southwest	-0.589*	0.260	-0.479*	0.249	-0.392*	0.223	-0.360	0.224
Gender	-0.027	0.120	0.003	0.113	0.021	0.087	0.019	0.088
Age	0.002	0.005	-0.004	0.005	0.012**	0.003	0.013**	0.003
Education	-0.170*	0.093	-0.219**	0.087	0.017	0.026	0.022	0.026
Experience	0.658**	0.142	0.575**	0.134	-0.079	0.088	-0.095	0.088
Constant	2.261**	0.385	1.562**	0.351	1.956**	0.312	2.128**	0.339
N	375		375		1965		1958	
F	2.84**		5.22**		3.17**		3.15**	

Note: The dependent variable ranges from responses reflecting more confidence in the outcome (lower values) to less confidence in the outcome (higher values). Thus, negative coefficients reflect higher levels of confidence. The question assessing training differs between the DEC and PEC surveys (see Appendix). For partisan variables, the Party of Regions is the excluded category. *=significant at the .10 level. **=significant at the .05 level.

Table 4: Multivariate Analysis of Administrator Assessments of Readiness (Prepared)

	PEC Pre				PEC Post			
	DV: Prepared	S.E.	DV: Prepared	S.E.	DV: Prepared	S.E.	DV: Prepared	S.E.
Training			-0.177*	0.104			0.006	0.084
CPU	0.096	0.163	0.101	0.165	-0.046	0.157	-0.053	0.159
Poroshenko Bloc	0.100	0.118	0.100	0.117	-0.171	0.112	-0.170	0.112
Batkivshchyna	-0.040	0.113	-0.045	0.112	-0.109	0.108	-0.105	0.108
Radical Party	0.119	0.131	0.110	0.131	-0.084	0.117	-0.083	0.117
Strong Ukraine	0.075	0.142	0.075	0.141	-0.156	0.129	-0.156	0.129
Opposition Bloc	-0.172	0.144	-0.175	0.144	-0.130	0.141	-0.130	0.142
People's Front	0.176	0.133	0.190	0.132	-0.194	0.126	-0.178	0.126
UDAR								
Svoboda								
Other	0.109	0.111	0.102	0.110	-0.057	0.105	-0.056	0.105
Eastcentral	-0.777**	0.160	-0.769**	0.160	-0.248**	0.094	-0.250**	0.094
South	-0.686**	0.165	-0.673**	0.164	-0.269**	0.111	-0.270**	0.111
Northcentral	-0.695**	0.150	-0.679**	0.149	-0.218**	0.091	-0.214**	0.091
Westcentral	-0.845**	0.146	-0.829**	0.144	-0.220**	0.084	-0.222**	0.083
West	-0.869**	0.159	-0.859**	0.157	-0.341**	0.097	-0.342**	0.096
Southwest	-0.867**	0.171	-0.846**	0.170	-0.288**	0.114	-0.290**	0.113
Gender	0.052	0.060	0.051	0.060	-0.009	0.058	-0.008	0.058
Age	-0.001	0.002	-0.001	0.002	0.003	0.002	0.003	0.002
Education	0.001	0.021	0.005	0.020	0.021	0.019	0.021	0.018
Experience	-0.092	0.067	-0.103	0.066	-0.107*	0.063	-0.108*	0.063
Constant	2.672**	0.250	2.787**	0.266	1.647**	0.209	1.640**	0.223
N	1943		1936		1734		1728	
F	2.89**		3.12**		1.98**		1.89**	

Note: The dependent variable ranges from responses reflecting more confidence in the outcome (lower values) to less confidence in the outcome (higher values). Thus, negative coefficients reflect higher levels of confidence. The question assessing training differs between the DEC and PEC surveys (see Appendix). For partisan variables, the Party of Regions is the excluded category. *=significant at the .10 level. **=significant at the .05 level.

Table 5: Multivariate Analysis of Administrator Assessments of Security

	DEC				PEC PRE				PEC Post			
	Coefficient	S.E.	Coefficient	S.E.	Coefficient	S.E.	Coefficient	S.E.	Coefficient	S.E.	Coefficient	S.E.
	DV: Sec		DV: Sec		DV: Sec		DV: Sec		DV: Sec		DV: Sec	
Training			0.160**	0.078			-0.018	0.075			-0.075	0.062
Additional Security Training			-0.282**	0.133			-0.128**	0.024			-0.053**	0.020
Contact w/ Law			-0.157	0.137			-0.162**	0.023			-0.050**	0.022
CPU	0.237	0.256	0.348	0.258	0.266**	0.134	0.248*	0.139	0.172	0.136	0.178	0.138
Poroshenko Bloc	1.112	0.782	1.326*	0.781	-0.012	0.063	-0.045	0.062	-0.013	0.056	-0.013	0.055
Batkivshchyna	0.089	0.178	0.251	0.227	0.012	0.064	-0.018	0.062	0.014	0.060	0.013	0.059
Radical Party	0.483	0.314	0.352	0.261	0.028	0.072	-0.009	0.070	0.015	0.062	0.011	0.062
Strong Ukraine					0.077	0.083	0.048	0.082	0.097	0.083	0.094	0.081
Opposition Bloc					0.015	0.086	-0.013	0.087	0.053	0.098	0.051	0.097
People's Front					0.067	0.077	0.041	0.076	-0.038	0.055	-0.041	0.055
UDAR	0.107	0.175	0.186	0.218								
Svoboda	0.218	0.189	0.448*	0.260								
Other	-0.337*	0.174	-0.504**	0.227	0.070	0.066	0.036	0.063	-0.006	0.057	-0.010	0.056
Eastcentral	-0.678**	0.250	-0.784**	0.302	-0.292**	0.121	-0.303**	0.121	-0.209**	0.074	-0.213**	0.075
South	-0.573**	0.268	-0.584**	0.332	-0.350**	0.113	-0.337**	0.112	-0.209**	0.068	-0.210**	0.069
Northcentral	-0.890**	0.238	-1.031**	0.296	-0.342**	0.108	-0.339**	0.109	-0.155**	0.071	-0.152**	0.073
Westcentral	-0.778**	0.248	-0.699**	0.310	-0.411**	0.106	-0.379**	0.105	-0.226**	0.066	-0.224**	0.067
West	-0.909**	0.234	-0.973**	0.286	-0.424**	0.108	-0.403**	0.107	-0.234**	0.065	-0.232**	0.066
Southwest	-0.527	0.395	-0.463	0.463	-0.482**	0.108	-0.467**	0.107	-0.227**	0.067	-0.226**	0.069
Gender	0.094	0.116	0.096	0.135	-0.079**	0.033	-0.072**	0.033	-0.003**	0.029	-0.002**	0.029
Age	0.003	0.005	0.000	0.006	-0.003*	0.001	-0.003*	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001
Education	0.017	0.084	0.039	0.092	0.013	0.014	0.013	0.013	-0.022*	0.011	-0.021**	0.011
Experience	-0.179	0.152	-0.267	0.167	-0.043	0.036	-0.044	0.036	-0.046**	0.019	-0.050**	0.020
Constant	1.011**	0.372	1.095**	0.411	0.514**	0.143	0.614**	0.164	0.370**	0.109	0.432**	0.129
N	384		301		1991		1984		1736		1730	
F	1.93**		2.21**		2.68**		4.90**		1.99**		1.89**	

Note: The scale ranges from 0-4, summing responses from four security related questions (yes/no). Negative coefficients reflect fewer concerns about security. For partisan variables, the Party of Regions is the excluded category. *=significant at the .10 level. **=significant at the .05 level.

Table 6: Multivariate Analysis of Administrator Assessments of Integrity (Compensation)

	DEC				PEC Pre				PEC Post			
	Coefficient	S.E.	Coefficient	S.E.	Coefficient	S.E.	Coefficient	S.E.	Coefficient	S.E.	Coefficient	S.E.
	DV: Comp		DV: Comp		DV: Comp		DV: Comp		DV: Comp		DV: Comp	
State Compensation			-0.253**	0.058			-0.108**	0.029			-0.096**	0.037
CPU	0.423	0.427	0.598	0.414	0.413*	0.225	0.246	0.232	0.253	0.256	0.352	0.291
Poroshenko Bloc	-1.257**	0.632	-0.883	0.589	0.164	0.169	0.091	0.174	-0.139	0.195	-0.026	0.213
Batkivshchyna	0.252	0.300	0.270	0.290	0.217	0.163	0.154	0.167	-0.154	0.193	0.079	0.212
Radical Party	-0.779**	0.389	-0.582	0.387	0.054	0.191	-0.006	0.206	-0.153	0.221	-0.063	0.246
Strong Ukraine					0.038	0.200	0.027	0.206	-0.253	0.233	-0.087	0.251
Opposition Bloc					0.246	0.211	0.213	0.224	0.048	0.253	0.217	0.278
People's Front					0.128	0.198	0.136	0.208	-0.034	0.227	0.181	0.253
UDAR	-0.152	0.299	-0.169	0.292								
Svoboda	0.634**	0.317	0.901**	0.277								
Other	-0.273	0.241	-0.302	0.241	0.144	0.155	0.082	0.158	-0.104	0.187	0.034	0.205
Eastcentral	-0.100	0.268	-0.228	0.250	0.124	0.160	0.176	0.161	0.036	0.182	0.095	0.227
South	0.233	0.306	-0.032	0.295	-0.172	0.163	-0.091	0.166	-0.100	0.192	-0.155	0.242
Northcentral	-0.279	0.266	-0.358	0.248	-0.052	0.145	0.017	0.148	-0.029	0.165	-0.023	0.212
Westcentral	-0.046	0.286	-0.167	0.272	0.614**	0.155	0.780**	0.163	0.534**	0.173	0.437**	0.222
West	-0.172	0.292	-0.407	0.282	0.873**	0.169	0.867**	0.174	1.039**	0.182	0.954**	0.227
Southwest	0.056	0.327	-0.128	0.315	0.528**	0.202	0.567**	0.208	0.437*	0.245	0.314	0.258
Gender	-0.165	0.143	-0.237*	0.138	0.132	0.091	0.132	0.093	0.117	0.099	0.115	0.112
Age	-0.001	0.006	-0.001	0.005	0.003	0.003	0.005	0.003	0.000	0.003	0.002	0.004
Education	0.021	0.098	0.079	0.108	-0.008	0.029	0.003	0.031	0.007	0.029	0.010	0.033
Experience	0.141	0.223	0.221	0.236	-0.056	0.097	0.002	0.105	-0.029	0.109	-0.030	0.122
Constant	3.656**	0.446	4.514**	0.495	2.098**	0.313	2.340**	0.337	2.512**	0.345	2.576**	0.400
N	347		326		1751		1544		1606		1307	
F	1.97**		4.12**		6.74**		7.18**		5.97**		4.68**	

Table 7: Multivariate Analysis of Administrator Assessments of Integrity (Quid Pro Quo for Supplementary Pay, and Fraud)

	PEC Pre-Election		PEC Post-Election					
	Coefficient	S.E.	Coefficient	S.E.	Coefficient	S.E.	Coefficient	S.E.
	DV: Pay More/Exp.		DV: Pay More/Exp.		DV: Fraud		DV: Fraud	
Training							0.082	0.090
Process Time							-0.012	0.009
Protocol Change							0.001	0.063
CPU	-0.279	0.298	-0.309	0.273	-0.055	0.152	-0.084	0.154
Poroshenko Bloc	-0.060	0.238	-0.229	0.214	-0.163	0.114	-0.178	0.116
Batkivshchyna	-0.185	0.235	-0.321	0.214	-0.072	0.106	-0.074	0.107
Radical Party	-0.118	0.273	-0.318	0.260	-0.075	0.123	-0.098	0.126
Strong Ukraine	0.097	0.276	-0.277	0.268	-0.137	0.142	-0.112	0.143
People's Front	0.118	0.286	-0.076	0.257	-0.080	0.148	-0.075	0.149
Opposition Bloc	-0.121	0.264	-0.075	0.237	-0.074	0.122	-0.120	0.126
UDAR								
Svoboda								
Other	-0.205	0.227	-0.362*	0.205	-0.107	0.102	-0.101	0.103
Eastcentral	0.220	0.198	0.333	0.229	0.317**	0.133	0.260*	0.147
South	0.386**	0.199	0.614**	0.223	0.442**	0.139	0.364**	0.154
Northcentral	0.582**	0.174	0.411**	0.203	0.293**	0.128	0.227	0.144
Westcentral	0.573**	0.180	0.473**	0.208	0.443**	0.127	0.386**	0.143
West	0.274	0.201	0.323	0.222	-0.381**	0.151	-0.449**	0.165
Southwest	0.364	0.272	0.688**	0.231	0.384*	0.201	0.275	0.225
Gender	-0.065	0.112	-0.040	0.113	0.106*	0.055	0.124**	0.056
Age	-0.003	0.004	0.005	0.004	0.005**	0.002	0.005**	0.002
Education	0.055*	0.033	0.056*	0.033	0.004	0.019	0.002	0.019
Experience	0.037	0.123	0.229**	0.110	0.009	0.064	0.027	0.066
Constant	3.255**	0.401	3.271**	0.411	4.086**	0.225	4.144**	0.266
N	1672		1497		1566		1493	
F	1.42		1.60*		5.54**		5.27**	




Figure 1: Macroregions of Ukraine

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