

ASK AND YOU SHALL RECEIVE?:
LEGISLATOR REQUESTS AND REPRESENTATION IN UKRAINE'S VERKHOVNA RADA

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Introduction

Legislators have many tools to fulfill their responsibilities as representatives. Indeed, a significant subset of the literature on representation addresses how elected legislators provide constituency service. Constituency service activities may include securing resources for the district, providing information to citizens, or intervening with government agencies to prompt a response or resolve a dispute. This paper uses data from Ukraine to extend our knowledge about representation and constituency service.

As a new democracy with evolving norms about representation, Ukraine provides an ideal setting to investigate legislative activity. Our research focuses on a specific mechanism through which legislators may perform constituency service. Legislators have the right to file formal requests for information or action from parliamentary bodies, government ministries, regional politicians, and directors of enterprises and organizations. Officially, these requests serve an oversight function. However, they often constitute advocacy efforts by legislators, and provide important insights into how politicians fulfill their roles as elected representatives. Ukraine's parliament collects and publishes information about requests, and they constitute a key data source for our investigation.

In the paper, we address several questions related to the use of deputy requests: Do changes in electoral rules affect the use of deputy requests? Do parties use requests differently? What explains variation in the use of requests among individual legislators? We address these issues in four sections. First, we outline theoretical expectations, focusing on the constituency service literature. Second, we explain the formal institutional rules surrounding deputy requests in Ukraine. Third, we present data aggregated at the level of parties and parliamentary sessions to evaluate hypotheses about institutional and partisan effects. Fourth, we present findings from our analysis of individual-level data to discern what features influence how deputies use requests.

Theoretical Expectations

A sizable literature has emerged on how elected representatives fulfill their advocacy role through the provision of constituency services. Many scholars link incentives associated with institutional rules to constituency service, and most of the empirical literature addresses single-member district constituencies (especially in the United States, Canada, Australia, and UK). Because legislators in these systems have geographically-defined constituencies, and are dependent upon voters in the district for electoral success, they encounter strong incentives to regularly – and publicly – advocate for the district's interests.¹

However, standard majoritarian systems may not be the only electoral arrangements that provide incentives for service activities, and institutional variation could induce different behaviors (Halligan et al 1998; Heitshusen, Young, and Wood 2005; Ashworth and Bueno de Mesquita 2006). In mixed electoral systems that combine majoritarian and proportional votes in a single legislative election, legislators in majoritarian seats may display markedly different behavior than their counterparts in party list seats (Lancaster and Patterson 1990, Judge and Ilonszki 1995, Thames 2005).² In addition,

1 The cultivation of a "personal vote" is particularly important for politicians in single-member districts (Cain, Ferejohn, and Fiorina (1987).

2 The interaction of majoritarian and proportional rules may create different incentives for legislators, however. Some

legislators may have an incentive to provide services even in PR because their actions could benefit the party's overall performance (Denemark 2003), and/or the legislator's future position on the party list. In our analysis, we include data from mixed and fully PR systems and address institutional effects using aggregate data.

A legislator's orientation to the constituency features prominently in several studies; the "localness" of a legislator is considered to be a strong determinant of constituency service. Legislators may be closely connected to a geographically-defined constituency due to their residence, education, or the constituency's features. Legislators with more local credentials, such as long residency in a constituency, or those representing relatively small and/or rural constituencies, tend to allocate more time to service activities than their "cosmopolitan" counterparts (Clarke et al 1975; Clarke 1978; Halligan et al 1988).³ In our analysis, we control for this feature by coding residence of SMD deputies elected in the 4th Rada.

Another motivation for constituency service could be individual career advancement. Services could be designed to earn voters' trust, cultivate a personal vote, and improve electoral outcomes (Clarke 1978; Cain, Ferejohn and Fiorina 1987; Parker 1989; Serra and Moon 1994) especially in competitive districts (Clarke 1978). In addition, incumbents and legislators with longer experience may be more likely to have access to, and reap rewards from, constituency service (King 1991; Heitshusen, Young, and Wood 2005; Ashworth and Bueno de Mesquita 2006).⁴ A legislator's ideology and/or party membership (Clarke 1978; Halligan et al 1988; Ashworth and Bueno de Mesquita 2006) could also influence the tendency to provide constituency services.⁵ Further, legislators who aspire to higher offices (i.e., those who display progressive ambition) are more likely to monitor opinion (Maestas 2003) and perhaps also to provide services. In our analysis, we include variables for incumbency and district competitiveness to account for career orientation.

Lastly, demographic features such as gender (Richardson and Freeman 1995) and education level (Clarke 1978) may influence the propensity to provide services. The characteristics of the district may also influence services, with variation in political culture among regions posited as an important factor affecting legislator behavior (Johannes 1983). In our analysis, we include variables controlling for gender and education levels, as well as region.⁶

Legislator Requests in Ukraine

studies have suggested that the seat mandate is less important than the electoral path; legislators in mixed systems might contest both in SMD races and on the PR list, or solely in SMD or in PR (Herron 2002). In this analysis we include only one parliament elected under mixed rules. In the 2002 election, candidates could not simultaneously contest majoritarian and proportional seats. Consequently, seat mandate may be a more important determinant in the election than in other mixed systems that allow dual candidacy.

- 3 This principle could also be extended to parties. Parties with stronger local organizations may provide more constituency services. In other words, parties may be more "local" or "cosmopolitan" in orientation, just as legislators.
- 4 Some research, however, has found weak support for incumbency advantage (Gaines 1998), although other work suggests that weak support may be due to methodological issues rather than conceptual errors (King 1991).
- 5 While it may be problematic to use party membership as a proxy for personal ideology (Thames 2004) it is a standard practice.
- 6 Instead of controlling for all of Ukraine's 27 major geographic units (24 oblasts, an autonomous republic, and two cities of special significance), we aggregate regions into eight macro-regional units (Barrington and Herron 2004).

Statutory Foundation of Legislator Requests

Parliamentary regulations delineate three mechanisms for deputies to exert oversight: requests, hearings, and methods to monitor the activities of the Cabinet of Ministers. Deputy requests (зпит in Ukrainian/запрос in Russian) are formally designed to provide a tool to check and monitor the behavior of other institutions. Ukraine's constitution, Law on the Status of People's Deputies of Ukraine, and Regulations (Reglament) of parliament define the purpose and parameters of legislator requests. Ukraine's constitution notes that a deputy has the right to direct requests to "bodies of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, to the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine, to the heads of other state bodies and local self-governing units, and also to the heads of enterprises, bodies, and organizations located on the territory of Ukraine... Heads of state governing bodies and local self governing units, enterprises, departments, and organizations must inform the Verkhovna Rada about the results of the inquiry..." (Article 86, translation by the authors). Six institutions constitute the main targets of deputy requests: the president, parliamentary speaker or committee heads, Cabinet of Ministers, ministerial or department heads, Chief Prosecutor, and local authorities.

While requests are formally associated with oversight, many deputy requests seem to focus on providing constituency services. Moreover, the formal rules for filing a deputy request also suggest that they could serve a dual function. Deputy requests are read into the official parliamentary record during plenary sessions (held on Fridays, and in some cases, Wednesdays). At the plenary session, the legislator (or group of legislators) publicly identifies the issue and the institution to which the request is directed. The only exception to this general rule are requests directed to the president; these requests must receive a favorable parliamentary vote to be placed in the record.

Data on Legislator Requests

The Law on the Status of People's Deputies of Ukraine defines the time period when a deputy has the right to exercise official functions. Because deputies alone may issue requests, the formal start and end of parliamentary convocations demarcates the time periods for requests. The beginning of the first session is supposed to take place no later than 30 days after the official announcement of election results. Because results are not certified until complaints are adjudicated, the new parliament may not sit until long after election day. For the 4th convocation of the Rada, elected on March 30, 2002, formal terms of deputies began on May 14, 2002. For the 5th convocation of the Rada, elected on March 26, 2006, formal terms of deputies began on May 25, 2006. For the 6th convocation of the Rada, elected on September 30, 2007, formal terms of deputies began on November 23, 2007. The final date of the parliamentary convocation is more difficult to define. The constitution (Article 90) indicates that the powers of the Verkhovna Rada stop on the day of the new convocation's first plenary session, but lame-duck parliaments have controversially met after the official end of the final session.⁷

We focused on the initial three-four sessions of parliament (each parliamentary convocation is divided into sessions) to maximize the number of cases under analysis and their equivalence. Because the 5th Rada (elected in 2006) was prematurely ended during the fourth session, and the 6th Rada (elected in 2007) continues to meet, we focused on early sessions. Table 1 summarizes the sessions under analysis,

⁷ For example, then-parliamentary speaker Oleksandr Moroz called a disputed session prior to the 2007 parliamentary election.

noting when they were active and the number of requests filed.⁸

Insert Table 1 about here

The Verkhovna Rada makes available information about deputy requests on its website (<http://portal.rada.gov.ua/>).⁹ These reports indicate the identity of the deputy filing the request, the institution to which the request was directed, as well as a summary of the content. In some cases, deputy requests clearly identify an issue that is related to oversight. For example, a deputy might make a request indicating that a government decision or response is unsatisfactory, and the deputy does not identify a constituency. Or, a deputy might issue a challenge to government actions. For example, Deputy Mykola Katerenchuk filed a request about ostensibly inappropriate efforts by the prosecutor to regulate deputy activities (an oversight function).

In other cases, the request may indicate that some action is needed on behalf of an individual or group of citizens. These requests most evidently reflect representation when they are submitted by legislators in geographically-defined districts and the subject of the request is located in the deputy's constituency. For example, Deputy Serhiy Osyka filed a request concerning additional budgetary subsidies for a village in his district (a representative function).

Discriminating between requests focusing on control or representation is more complicated when the local connection is absent. Consequently, we coded requests as representation when a constituency could be identified (usually through a geographic connection, but sometimes based on economic or social groups. For example, when Communist Party representatives make requests on behalf of industrial workers, we consider this request to reflect representation). The intent of some requests was ambiguous, or seemed to reflect both control and representation functions. In these cases, we coded the requests as both control and representation, and included a variable identifying hybrid requests. For example, Deputy Anatoliy Moroz filed a request to follow up on an unsatisfactory response to a previous request (an oversight function). The request focused on a purportedly unconstitutional denial of judicial examination involving a resident in the deputy's district (a representative function). While the initial request was focused on representation, the follow-up request also addressed oversight matters.

Analysis

While the notion of constituency service covers a wide range of actions, much of the literature measures legislator activity based on the amount of time allocated to service (e.g., Clarke 1978; Halligan et al 1988). Instead of focusing on time served, we assess the volume and type of requests issued by deputies. The independent variables in the constituency service literature tend to cover institutional features and legislator qualities. The latter factor may be subdivided into three conceptual

8 While the count includes all deputy requests, the subject matter of requests does not always differ. That is, an individual deputy might file a request on the same topic several times (to different institutions). We account for duplicate requests in our dataset, but do not formally address this issue in our analysis. For our purposes, a request reflects efforts at oversight and/or representation. A duplicate request does not undermine this function; duplicate requests might even provide further evidence of oversight.

9 For our paper, we concentrate on the formal submission of requests. The Rada provides limited information on responses to requests (addressing only when a response was provided, but not the nature or quality of the response).

groups: the legislator's "localness", professional orientation, and demographic characteristics. We address all of these categories in our analysis. The analysis covers two aspects of the process: what influences the number of requests that are filed, and what influences the kinds of requests that are filed.

Institutional Rules and Legislator Requests

As we noted in our discussion of theoretical expectations, the literature on constituency service indicates that institutional features affect the incentives facing deputies, and these incentives, in turn, are likely to influence how deputies approach their advocacy role. Most notably in the Ukrainian context, the change of electoral system from mixed to fully proportional rules between the 4th and 5th Radas is likely to reduce the incentives for using requests, especially as tools of representation. Lacking clearly defined geographic constituencies in a pure PR system, legislators face fewer incentives to perform services for voters.¹⁰ While the party can benefit from constituency service activities, the benefits to an individual legislator are lower than when the system featured single-member districts. How does electoral system change influence the use of requests?

Insert Figure 1 about here

Figure 1 displays data on the number of legislator requests filed by session for the three Rada convocations under analysis. Requests in the 4th Rada are disaggregated to show the number of requests by deputies in SMD and PR seats. A few observations are notable. First, in the 4th Rada, the number of deputy requests from those occupying PR seats exceeds the number of requests from those occupying SMD seats. Second, the overall number of requests drops substantially from the 4th to 5th Radas, at the same time that the mixed electoral system was abandoned and a fully proportional system was adopted. Third, while the number of requests increases over time in the 6th Rada, the frequency of requests still falls below the 4th Rada.

This figure implies that institutional change could have affected deputy behavior. However, the period between the 4th and 5th Radas was notable for another important change in Ukrainian politics. The Orange Revolution, which propelled the former opposition to power, altered the composition of the opposition and pro-government factions. Moreover, elections to the 5th Rada enhanced the position of the former political opposition. Layered on top of institutional change was a significant restructuring of the partisan environment which could influence the use of deputy requests.

Partisanship and Legislator Requests

As formal tools to provide oversight over government bodies, one might expect the use of requests to vary by party. Specifically, parties most closely associated with government might use these tools less frequently than parties outside of government; the opposition has a stronger incentive to monitor the activities of government than do parties associated with that government.

Insert Figure 2 about here

¹⁰ In our preliminary assessment of PR requests, we have discovered that some MPs elected on PR lists file many requests focused on a single region of Ukraine. This phenomenon of "regional specialization" among deputies was particularly notable among Communist Party representatives. It is possible that this phenomenon is driven by individual legislators with connections to the regions. Alternatively, it could reflect a coordinated strategy to ensure local representation within a national PR system. This is a puzzle for future analysis.

Figure 2 shows the frequency of deputy requests by party (and by tiers in the 4th Rada). Our Ukraine leads the way, with 1,147 requests in the first four sessions of the 4th Rada (of 3,048 total requests), followed by the Communist Party with 764 requests, and the Bloc of Yuliya Tymoshenko with 411. Notably, all of these factions – accounting for 76% of all requests in the 4th Rada – are a part of the broadly defined political opposition. While the policy goals of these parties differed, they were united in opposition to the regime of President Leonid Kuchma.

Clearly defining pro-government and opposition parties becomes complicated in the 5th and 6th Radas. After the 2006 election and a contentious process of government formation, the Party of Regions, Communist Party, and Socialist Party formed a coalition generating cohabitation. Moreover, the president's powers were reduced in constitutional reform that took effect in 2006. For our analysis, we treat pro-government as pro-presidential; parties supporting the prime minister are considered to be in the opposition. This interpretation is not based on the institutions of semi-presidential systems, but rather the contours of Ukraine's politics.

The politics of the 6th Rada remain complicated. While a new coalition formed between the president's Our Ukraine party and the Bloc of Yuliya Tymoshenko, the antagonistic relationship between Yushchenko and Tymoshenko did not render Tymoshenko's bloc an unambiguous partner for the president. We continue to treat Tymoshenko as part of the pro-government bloc during this time (because of its coalition agreement with Our Ukraine), but clear definitions of pro-government and opposition parties are often elusive in Ukraine's environment of shifting political allegiances.

Because of Yushchenko's victory in the presidential race in 2004, we treat previously pro-government parties as the political opposition in the 5th and 6th Radas. The leading party in terms of request submissions also changed, with the Party of Regions exceeding other factions in the frequency of requests. Its requests account for 175 of 427 requests (41%) in the 5th Rada and 307 of 1,045 requests (29%) in the 6th Rada. By contrast, Our Ukraine filed only 66 requests in the 5th Rada and 153 in the 6th Rada while Communist Party deputies filed 32 and 150, respectively. The Bloc of Yuliya Tymoshenko filed 108 and 281 requests, double its contribution from the 4th Rada.

Some of the variation in the frequency of requests may be due to the changing composition of the Rada. The Tymoshenko Bloc increased the number of deputies from 21 to 129 from the 4th to 5th Radas; whereas Our Ukraine's elected contingent dropped from 112 to 81. If parties use requests differently (especially if parties coordinate the use of requests), a change in delegation size could account for decreased activity. However, variation in requests may also reflect change in power over the 2004-2006 time period.

Insert Figure 3 about here

Figure 3 collapses factions into those that lean pro-government and those that lean pro-opposition. Parties associated with the opposition used deputy requests more frequently than pro-government parties in the 4th Rada. After the Orange Revolution and 2006 parliamentary election, pro-government and opposition parties used this tool less often. Further, instead of the opposition filing substantially more requests, pro-government and opposition factions filed requests at about the same level of

frequency. The change in frequency may be due, in part, to institutional changes noted above. They may also be due to a change in the composition of government and opposition parties; these two groups may differ in their strategic use of deputy requests.

Oversight Vs. Representation

The previous sections investigated potential solutions to the question of how deputy requests are used, and why their frequency changed over time. This section continues to probe how these tools are used, but turns to the initial question driving the paper: how have formal tools for oversight been used to advance representation?

If deputy requests were solely used as a method of control, as they are formally defined, one would expect opposition requests to consistently exceed government requests as the opposition has a stronger incentive to check the power of the governing parties. Yet, opposition requests were almost equal to government requests during the 5th and 6th Radas. If requests were solely used as a method of representation, one would expect both governing and opposition parties to use them as tools to benefit the parties electorally, especially when the electoral system featured constituency seats. While the number of requests declines after electoral system change, government and opposition parties differ in their use of these tools, especially in the 4th Rada.

Insert Figure 4 about here

To illustrate variation in the types of requests offered by legislators, Figure 4 displays the distribution of deputy requests for legislators elected in single-member districts in the 4th convocation. In addition to displaying the number of requests focused on control and representation, we also identify legislators by their faction's orientation (pro-government or opposition). Deputies associated with pro-government parties issued fewer requests, and more of them were associated with representation. Opposition deputies made more requests focused on representation until the fourth session when the number fell. The figure suggests that instead of focusing solely on oversight, deputy requests have been used to advocate for constituency interests.

Assessing data aggregated at the level of parties or sessions provides insight into the changing use of deputy requests. However, it does not allow us to draw conclusions about how individual deputies use this institutional tool. To evaluate individual-level behavior, we also assessed the factors influencing requests among deputies representing majoritarian constituencies in the 4th Rada. These deputies have the strongest incentives to pursue representation as they build a personal vote in their districts. Further, during the first four sessions of the 4th Rada, deputies were unaware that the electoral system would change to pure PR. We should expect them to behave as if they planned to defend their current districts in the next election.

Our analysis focuses on two dependent variables: the overall number of requests and the number of requests that are focused on representation. Because the data are counts of requests, and both dependent variables exhibit signs of overdispersion, we report results from a negative binomial regression.¹¹

11 Results from poisson regression were substantively similar to the results generated by negative binomial regression.

The independent variables account for issues that we identified in our theoretical expectations. The deputy's "localness" is represented by region of residence; SMD deputies are coded as 1 if they report living in the region that they represent.¹² We address career issues by coding for incumbency and the margin of victory in SMD races. We also add a control for gender, but omit education because deputy educational experience does not adequately vary.¹³ Regional issues – relevant for Ukraine and also noted in the literature on constituency service – are represented by variables aggregating oblasts into eight macro-regional units (Barrington and Herron 2004). Lastly, we control for faction affiliation and present results that identify deputies by their membership in pro-government or opposition factions.¹⁴

Insert Table 2 about here

Table 2 shows the results of the multivariate analysis. Absent controls for region or party affiliation, incumbency stands as the only statistically significant parameter estimate. The victory margin, local residency, and gender consistently fail to attain statistical significance. Surprisingly, incumbency exerts a negative effect on both legislator requests in general, and representation-oriented requests. This could reflect a practice by new legislators to more directly attempt to curry favor with locals to build re-election capacity in the constituency, or it could reflect a more complex relationship between legislators and formal requests.

The expanded models (Models 2 and 4) produce similar results for both dependent variables (total number of requests and number of representation-oriented requests). Incumbency no longer rises to statistical significance when controls are added for region and party; region and partisan affiliation variables significantly influence deputy behavior. Compared to the West, deputies in several regions (Crimea, East, and Northcentral) filed fewer requests, on average. Deputies representing the same regions (with the addition of the Eastcentral region) filed fewer representation-oriented requests, on average. Because partisanship in Ukraine is closely associated with region (e.g., Clem and Craumer 2008), it is possible that regional effects reflect partisan divides. However, with controls for region included in the models, membership in opposition factions is associated with an increased frequency of overall requests, and representation-oriented requests. Region and partisan orientation seem to exhibit independent effects on legislator behavior.

The preliminary results of individual-level analysis could be interpreted in several ways. The failure of some aspects of "localness" to attain statistical significance (notably the individual deputy's residence) could suggest that deputy ties to their constituencies are weak. Indeed, prior to the 4th Rada, deputies

12 We coded this variable in two ways using data from candidate biographies provided by the Central Electoral Commission. First, we created a variable for residence in the district they represent. In some cases, particularly deputies representing large cities, it was difficult to determine if their residence was within constituency boundaries. Second, we created a variable for residence in the region they represent. While this variable may overstate local residency by including representatives who do not live in their constituency as locals, its more generous definition of "localness" resolves the potential coding problem with the first variant.

13 Among SMD deputies, only three had incomplete higher education.

14 We conducted an analysis that controlled for all factions. However, because Ukrainian MPs often move among factions (Herron 2004; Thames 2007), controlling for faction membership requires models that account for sessions as well. MPs tend to move factions within the broadly-defined pro-government and opposition umbrella, prompting our simplified coding.

could contest both majoritarian and party list seats simultaneously, potentially creating incentives to satisfy both local and national concerns (Herron 2002). Hedging bets in previous elections, particularly among incumbents contesting for the 4th Rada, may have undermined the connection between legislators and their constituents.

Another potential explanation stems from the primary institutional goal of requests. While they may be used to advocate for constituent interests, they are formally an oversight tool. The more prominent use of requests by the opposition, even when they have a more "representative" flavor, suggests that this role could predominate in the 4th Rada. The decline in use of requests during the 5th and 6th Radas could be explained, at least in the short term, by the change in the opposition. The "new" opposition, formerly in the pro-government camp, may not use deputy requests in the same way as the "old" opposition. Perhaps they have not learned to use this institutional tool in the same manner, or perhaps they have chosen to challenge the sitting government through other mechanisms.

Conclusion

Our preliminary findings suggest that variation in the use of deputy requests may be related to institutional and political factors, but more research is necessary to disentangle these effects. The volume of deputy requests, and their diverse content, suggests that they are an important tool to assess as mechanisms to monitor government behavior and enhance services to citizens. Moreover, deputy requests are used in other systems (e.g., Russia and Moldova); findings in Ukraine could be generalized to other parliaments.

As the project evolves, we plan to code additional data to more fully explore the content of requests, and patterns of usage in other parliamentary convocations. In addition, we will further develop the models of individual-level behavior and incorporate data from party list elections. Although preliminary, our assessment of deputy requests has potential implications for scholarship on accountability, representation, electoral systems, and democratization.

Table 1: Sessions of the Verkhovna Rada and Number of Deputy Requests

	Session 1	Session 2	Session 3	Session 4
4 th Rada (2002)	5/02-7/02 60 Requests	9/02-1/03 508 Requests	2/03-7/03 1428 Requests	9/03-1/04 1052 Requests
5 th Rada (2006)	5/06-8/06 17 Requests	9/06-1/07 250 Requests	2/07-7/07 160 Requests	8/07 0 Requests
6 th Rada (2007)	11/07-1/08 10 Requests	2/08-7/08 383 Requests	9/08- 645 Requests	




Figure 1: Deputy Requests by Constituency Type (4th, 5th, and 6th Radas)




Figure 2: Deputy Requests by Faction and Constituency Type (4th, 5th, and 6th Radas)




Figure 3: Deputy Requests by Government and Opposition Factions (4th, 5th, and 6th Radas)




Figure 4: Deputy Requests in SMD (4th Rada), Categorized by Oversight and Representation Functions

Table 2: Individual-Level Analysis of Deputy Requests (SMD, 4th Rada)

	Model 1 DV: # of Requests	Model 2 DV: # of Requests	Model 3 DV: # of Representation- Focused Requests	Model 4 DV: # of Representation- Focused Requests
Victory Margin	0.000 (0.006)	-0.007 (0.006)	0.001 (0.006)	-0.008 (0.006)
Incumbent	-0.666* (0.275)	-0.351 (0.266)	-0.799* (0.293)	-0.329 (0.285)
Local Resident	-0.102 (0.652)	-0.042 (0.207)	-0.125 (0.234)	-0.032 (0.221)
Gender	0.510 (0.593)	-0.598 (0.543)	0.357 (0.608)	-0.487 (0.553)
Crimea		-1.453* (0.569)		-1.856* (0.651)
East		-1.083* (0.387)		-0.853* (0.397)
Eastcentral		-0.622 (0.352)		-0.732* (0.368)
South		-0.493 (0.408)		-0.506 (0.425)
Northcentral		-0.862* (0.309)		-0.985* (0.329)
Westcentral		-0.503 (0.336)		0.329 (0.349)
Opposition		1.293* (0.215)		1.187* (0.224)
Constant	1.248* (0.595)	2.167* (0.637)	0.956 (0.610)	1.679* (0.223)
LR Chi ²	5.67	70.91*	6.9	61.81*
Pseudo R ²	0.01	0.06	0.01	0.07
N	220	220	220	220

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